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The Product-Agnosia Effect: How More
Visual Impressions Affect Product
Distinctiveness in Comparative Choice
JAYSON SHI JIA
BABA SHIV
SANJAY RAO
Consumer choice is often based on the relative visual appeal of competing prod-
ucts. Lay intuition, common marketing practice, and extant literature all suggest
that more visual impressions help consumers distinguish products. This research
shows that the opposite can occur. Rather than highlighting differences, seeing
more pictures of products being compared can obfuscate perceptions, reduce
distinctiveness and attractiveness of products, and increase choice uncertainty.
Six experiments demonstrate that this “product-agnosia” effect is driven by shifts
in the perceptual focus level of visual information processing. More visual impres-
sions increased component-oriented and decreased gestalt-oriented perceptual
focus, which undermined the distinctiveness of products distinguished on a gestalt
level (e.g., by style). The effect reversed for products distinguished on a component
level (e.g., by technical features). Overall, the efficacy of “showing more” depended
on matching consumers’ visual-processing style and the level (gestalt vs. com-
ponent) at which products are differentiated.
Apicture is said to be worth a thousand words. Behindthe wisdom of this aphorism lies the recognition that
everyday judgments and decisions are heavily dependent on
visual information. It is thus no surprise that of the 11 mil-
lion bits of information processed by the human brain per
second, 10 million bits are dedicated to our visual system
(Wilson 2002). The prominence of visually based decision
making is especially relevant in consumer choice, where the
relative visual appeal of various offerings often determines
preferences and decisions. When browsing spring outfits in
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the glossy pages of Vogue, inspecting shoes from all possible
angles on an interactive picture gallery at zappos.com, or
going beyond pictures and closely examining different hand-
bags on display at Bloomingdale’s, consumers rely on visual
information to compare, differentiate, and evaluate various
products. The importance of visual appeal for consumers is
recognized by marketers and retailers alike, who constantly
bombard consumers with more visual impressions through
phalanxes of posters, picture-laden websites, and strategi-
cally arranged product displays. Although the veritable vi-
sual feast that retail environments offer undeniably brings
consumers a wealth of visual information, just how useful
is this information? If a “picture” is worth a thousand words,
does it imply that multiple pictures are worth many thousands
of words?
Consumer choice fundamentally depends on the ability
to distinguish between products during the decision-making
process. In physical or online retail environments, this pro-
cess is often heavily dependent on visual impressions. A
common and instinctive strategy for marketers attempting
to distinguish their products from others is to highlight dif-
ferences with more visual impressions (often in the form of
more pictures). For example, Internet retail shopping sites
commonly have the option of displaying multiple pictures
of products from different perspectives. Beyond intuition,
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extant literature also suggests that for visually based con-
sumer decisions, more pictures should facilitate visual in-
formation processing and that “looking at more” is a natural
inclination that aids decision making (Lurie and Mason
2007; Townsend and Sood 2011). On a basic level, increased
visual processing of items in a consideration set fosters dis-
ambiguation and differentiation by providing more infor-
mation about product features (Bloch, Brunel, and Arnold
2003; Carpenter, Glazer, and Nakamoto 1994). Contrary to
such intuition, we propose that the common strategy of
“looking at more” can backfire and that showing more visual
impressions when comparing products can make the prod-
ucts seem less distinguishable, less unique, and less attrac-
tive. Since vision is fundamentally a constructive process
(Biederman 1989; Treisman 1998), viewing more visual im-
pressions can be counterproductive if doing so distorts how
visual information is integrated, processed, and interpreted.
In other words, looking at more can end up yielding less if
it changes how we look in potentially detrimental ways.
Previous research suggests that deeper processing of in-
formation increases attention to details as one tries to dif-
ferentiate objects through differences in minutia (Grill-Spec-
tor and Kanwisher 2005; Johnson 1984). Consistent with
these findings, we suggest that showing consumers more
pictures of products in a consideration set can lead to in-
creased detailed, component-oriented and decreased holistic,
gestalt-oriented perceptual focus in visual information pro-
cessing (Lockhead, Gruenewald, and King 1978). Since
many marketed products are distinguished by gestalt (rather
than component level) aspects such as brand, style, and
design (Aaker 1997; Bloch et al. 2003; Corfman 1991; Hagt-
vedt and Patrick 2008; Hekkert and Leder 2008; Patrick and
Hagtvedt 2011; Thompson and Hamilton 2006), such a rel-
ative shift from gestalt- to component-level focus in visual
information processing can be maladaptive and decrease
perceptions of uniqueness and attractiveness. This change
in perceptual focus is akin to comparing impressionist paint-
ings by juxtaposing their brush strokes rather than their
overall imagery or comparing shirts by contrasting their
buttons instead of their overall pattern. However, one might
expect the opposite effect to arise for products that are de-
fined by component-level aspects such as details, technical
features, and attributes. Overall, the relative benefit of view-
ing more visual impressions when comparing depends on
the perceptual level at which consumers’ visual processing
occurs matching the perceptual focus level (gestalt vs. com-
ponent) at which products are differentiated. When there is
a mismatch of perceptual focus orientations, seeing more
can ironically give rise to product agnosia, a visual ho-
mogenization that detracts from products’ ultimate distinc-
tiveness and appeal.
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
The rationale behind the product-agnosia effect is that
seeing more visual impressions during comparative evalu-
ations shifts perceptual focus between two separate levels.
The first is a higher level of overall evaluation that has
alternatively been called gestalt, holistic, or global (Bied-
erman 1989; Treisman 1998). The second is a lower level
of detail-oriented evaluation that has alternatively been
called component, detail, or local (Friedman 1979; Navon
1977). We propose that showing more pictures of compar-
ison objects changes how one looks and changes one’s level
of visual evaluation from a gestalt to a component level, so
that one starts focusing less on the overall and more on the
details. Thus, comparing more visual impressions of prod-
ucts can potentially make products that are primarily dif-
ferentiated by gestalt appeal seem more similar and less
unique and subsequently increase choice uncertainty and
decrease valuation of products. At the same time, the effect
should be attenuated for products that are primarily differ-
entiated on a component level.
Shifting between Gestalt- to Component-Oriented
Processing
Research in perceptual psychology suggests that visual
processing typically proceeds from an overall high-level rec-
ognition (gestalt level) to a progressively more detailed
structural analysis (component level; Navon 1977). In the
hierarchy of the visual world, this means that we first tend
to perceive the forest before the trees, and trees before the
leaves. The predominance of gestalt- over component-level
processing corresponds with the greater importance of the
gestalt whole over individual parts in visual recognition.
Indeed, one cannot visually recognize objects without per-
ceiving the whole, although one can still recognize objects
without perceiving the parts (Biederman 1989; Treisman
1998). For example, one can visually form the impression
that two faces are similar without having noticed the color
of the eyes or shape of the nose, while the inverse is not
true (Kimchi 1992).
Although gestalt-level processing is usually the default in
visual processing, various factors, visual and cognitive, can
foster a shift to component-level processing (Fo¨rster and
Dannenberg 2010). Increased visual inspection is one such
process. There are numerous reasons why deeper visual in-
spection and processing of additional visual impressions can
interrupt visual processing at the gestalt level and result in
a component-level perceptual focus (e.g., switching from
looking at style, design, and patterns of a product to ex-
amining the individual touches, features, and nuts-and-bolts
details). The visual-processing literature provides evidence
that increased inspection moves visual focus forward in a
“reverse hierarchical order” (Hochstein and Ahissar 2002),
starting with a focus on the gestalt, where the overall gist
of an object is first seen, processed, and captured in about
200 milliseconds (Friedman 1979; Oliva and Torralba 2006).
However, once the gist has been captured, the acquisition
of extra visual impressions progressively moves attention
to details that are not seen at first glance and require in-
creased visual scrutiny (Grill-Spector and Kanwisher 2005;
Johnson 1984; Smith 2001). This suggests that when making
product comparisons, the extra visual impressions from see-
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ing more pictures of each product should lead to attempts
at identifying component-level differences across the prod-
ucts. Such a switch in relative focus to component-level
differences is also a common consequence of numerous con-
trast-oriented visual and cognitive search strategies that
come with deeper levels of information processing (Car-
penter et al. 1994; Rensink 2002; Thompson and Hamilton
2006).
The Impact of Shifting Perceptual Focus
While shifts in perceptual focus often occur naturally and
adaptively, there are also instances in which a situationally
induced switch in perceptual focus can turn out to be mal-
adaptive. Such changes can be detrimental when there is a
mismatch between the perceptual focus of processing and
the perceptual focus level that differentiates products. Shifts
in perceptual focus of processing may arise via visual or
cognitive routes. For example, looking at more pictures dur-
ing product comparisons can move perceptual focus away
from gestalt aspects. Similarly, adopting a component-ori-
ented cognitive-processing style should also move percep-
tual focus from the gestalt to the component level.
For products that are differentiated on the gestalt level,
such shifts in perceptual focus can give rise to product ag-
nosia. Such products may provide similar functional utility
and share common component-level features (e.g., lamps
have shades, cars have wheels) but are often primarily dif-
ferentiated by gestalt aspects such as product design (Bloch
1995; Hagtvedt and Patrick 2008). These gestalt aspects
include dimensions such as shape, size, style, symmetry,
balance, proportions, and contours—all of which can shape
consumer evaluations and impression formation (Hekkert
and Leder 2008; Veryzer 1999). For such products, a switch
in perceptual focus essentially reduces focus on the aspects
on which they are differentiated. Without visual differen-
tiation on the perceptual level on which they are defined,
products stand to lose their distinctiveness, desirability, and
lasting appeal and become homogenous and forgettable.
However, not all products are visually differentiated on
a gestalt level. Many products may be defined more by
details, components, and technical features (Bloch et al.
2003; Carpenter et al. 1994). It should be noted that although
many such products are technical products, their component-
level differences must be visible; for example, screen quality
of a television can be seen if the screen in turned on, whereas
processing speed of a computer is difficult to convey in a
two-dimensional picture. A perceptual focus mechanism
predicts an attenuation of the product-agnosia effect for
products distinguished relatively more by component-level
visual differences.
Processing Style Changing Perceptual Focus. If relative
perceptual focus on gestalt- versus component-level features
drives product agnosia, then we would expect an exogenous
manipulation of processing style (gestalt vs. component) to
moderate the effect. Extant literature has shown that gestalt-
versus component-level perceptual processing (seeing a for-
est or trees) is cognitively intertwined with gestalt- versus
component-level conceptual processing (thinking broadly or
narrowly about the forest or trees; for a review, see Fo¨rster
and Dannenberg 2010). For example, being procedurally
primed to see the gestalt can also result in greater higher-
level creative processing (Friedman et al. 2003) and broader,
more inclusive social categorizations (Fo¨rster, Liberman,
and Kuschel 2008). At the same time, being procedurally
primed to think about the gestalt can also help in visually
discerning higher-level visual patterns (Fo¨rster and Dan-
nenberg 2010). In other words, the level at which one thinks
about objects can change the level of one’s visual processing
and vice versa. The carryover effect of conceptual-process-
ing style to visual-processing style occurs because both types
of processing are based on common cognitive mechanisms
(Fo¨rster et al. 2008). Thus, we expect that when comparing
gestalt-oriented products, inducing gestalt processing should
attenuate product agnosia, while inducing component-ori-
ented processing should maintain product agnosia and its
downstream effects. Conversely, the opposite should be the
case for component-oriented products.
In the first four experiments that follow, which focus on
products differentiated primarily by gestalt factors, we find
that showing more pictures of products generates product
agnosia—the loss of ability to distinguish between products
(experiments 1 and 2). According to our conceptualization,
product agnosia is driven by shifts in visual-processing style
from gestalt- to component-level perceptual focus that ren-
ders products (that are defined by gestalt-level factors such
as style and design) less distinctive and attractive. We test
this proposition by moderating the product-agnosia effect
directly via manipulation of visual-processing style (exper-
iment 3) and indirectly via manipulation of stimulus- versus
memory-based judgments (experiment 4). Finally, in the last
two experiments, we show that the product-agnosia effect
attenuates for products or comparison sets that are defined
by component-level differences (experiments 5 and 6).
Overall, this research highlights the importance of matching
the visual information content of marketing with consumers’
visual information-processing style; showing more visual
impressions (e.g., more product images) only abets con-
sumer choice and product evaluations when visual infor-
mation content matches visual-processing style.
EXPERIMENT 1: THE PRODUCT-
AGNOSIA EFFECT
The purpose of experiment 1 was to document the basic
product-agnosia effect—that showing consumers more pic-
tures of products under comparison can reduce the distinc-
tiveness of products differentiated at the gestalt level. The
basic experimental paradigm throughout this article was to
show participants one picture or multiple pictures (one at a
time) of each set of products, each on a separate page. The
visual scenarios were designed to reflect the visual contexts
in actual purchasing environments, particularly in online
marketplaces where shoppers are shown more pictures of
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products from “additional views” to abet decision making.
In addition, we explored the necessary conditions for the
effect by testing (1) whether new visual information was
required or if repeated inspection of the same visual infor-
mation was sufficient and (2) whether the effect could occur
for quicker visual inspections or if more careful and delib-
erate visual processing was required. The existence of the
effect under different visual processing and information con-
ditions would provide intuition on possible processes behind
the hypothesized effect. For example, if product agnosia
only occurs when new information is present, then famil-
iarity is unlikely to be the underlying mechanism. Similarly,
if sufficient visual-inspection time is necessary, then an in-
formation-processing mechanism is more likely than an ex-
posure-driven process. Finally, we included a cognitive task
at the end of the experiment to check whether an effect
arose because showing more pictures taxed participants’
cognitive resources.
Method
We used two actual products from the same product cat-
egory (fashion sunglasses: DKNY vs. Michael Kors) as
comparison objects in the interest of ecological validity and
to control for unforeseen effects of cross-category compar-
isons. The product images and presentation formats were
obtained from a leading online retailer (zappos.com). Par-
ticipants recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk subject
pool (N p 245) were randomly assigned to one of four
visual conditions: single picture (single), multiple repeated
picture (repeated), multiple unique picture with careful vi-
sual processing (multiple unique careful), and multiple
unique picture with quick visual processing (multiple unique
quick; fig. 1).
Visual Conditions. In the single-picture condition, par-
ticipants were shown one picture of each pair of sunglasses
(at the default isometric angle typically found in print and
Internet product catalogs), each on a separate page. For hy-
pothesis testing, the single-picture condition was always
used as a baseline against which the effect of showing more
pictures was contrasted.
In the multiple-repeated-picture condition, participants
were shown the same image for each product seven times,
each on a separate page. There was no time limit, and par-
ticipants self-paced through each of the 14 pages. This al-
lowed us to see the effect of seeing more pictures of a
product when there was no new visual information in the
pictures. Any differences between perception ratings be-
tween the single and multiple-repeated conditions will thus
be the result of increased familiarity and exposure effects
independent of new information.
In the multiple-unique-careful (multiple-careful) condi-
tion, participants were shown the “default” picture as well
as six other unique pictures taken from different vantage
points (see fig. 1) for each product. Each picture was on a
new page, and participants self-paced through each new
page/picture. This condition, which most accurately reflects
how additional visual information is conveyed by retailers,
allowed us to see the impact of additional pictures that car-
ried new visual information when there was opportunity to
carefully examine each picture.
The multiple-unique-quick (multiple-quick) condition con-
tained the same pictures as the multiple-unique-careful con-
dition. However, for each pair of sunglasses, all seven pic-
tures were on one page, and participants only had 10 seconds
to examine the pictures before the survey advanced auto-
matically. Participants were warned to be prepared for the
time limit before they could start viewing the pictures. This
condition allowed us to see the impact of having additional
visual information without the necessary time to carefully
examine the each picture. For all conditions, the order of
presentation of the products was randomized (some saw the
DKNY sunglasses first; others saw the Michael Kors sun-
glasses first).
Dependent Variables. After the picture viewings, we
measured choice, liking ratings, similarity perceptions, and
choice uncertainty. The default picture (isometric view) of
each pair of sunglasses (the first pictures of each pair of
sunglasses in all conditions) was displayed on the top of
each dependent measures page to aid comparative evaluation
and to maintain ecological validity (since shoppers in both
physical and online stores usually have the products in front
of them during decision making). Participants were first
asked to imagine that they were shopping at the store and
choosing between the two sunglasses, with the option of
deferring choice. If participants deferred choice, they were
asked to make a forced choice on the next page so that the
following dependent measures would still be meaningful.
Participants next rated how regretful (1 [not regretful at all]
to 7 [very regretful]) and confident they were in their choice
(1 [not confident at all] to 7 [very confident]), how much
they liked the sunglasses they picked (1 [not at all] to 7
[very much]), how similar the sunglasses were (1 [not sim-
ilar at all] to 7 [very similar]), and how distinctive each pair
of sunglasses was to each other (1 [not distinctive at all] to
7 [very distinctive]). The scale measures were averaged into
an index for similarity (a p .75) and an index for choice
uncertainty (a p .76).
Cognitive Resources. At the end of the experiment, par-
ticipants were asked to solve three anagrams and two visual
geometric manipulation puzzles. The number of correct an-
swers was summed to create a cognitive resources score.
Time spent was also measured by a page timer.
Results
Cognitive Resources. Planned contrasts showed no sig-
nificant differences in cognitive resource scores (Msingle p
3.11, SD p 1.14; Mrepeat p 3.25, SD p 1.29; Mcareful p
3.05, SD p1.10; Mquick p 3.34, SD p .96; all F ! 1) or
time spent solving the puzzles (Msingle p 170 seconds, SD
p 92; Mrepeat p 172 seconds, SD p 120; Mcareful p 183
seconds, SD p 114; Mquick p 196 seconds, SD p 117; all
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FIGURE 1
STIMULI PRESENTED IN EXPERIMENT 1
F ! 1) between any of the visual conditions. There was no
difference even after removal of outliers for the timing mea-
sure (all F ! 1). Indeed, we did not expect any cognitive
resource depletion effects since participants only viewed a
small number of images for two products.
Time Spent on Picture Pages. Page timers showed that
participants spent a mean duration of 8.12 seconds (SD p
4.58) on each of the two picture pages in the single-picture
condition (16.2 seconds total), 2.73 seconds (SD p 1.50)
on each of the 14 picture pages in the multiple-repeated
condition (38.2 seconds total), 5.55 seconds (SD p 5.51)
on each of the 14 picture pages in the multiple-careful con-
dition (77.8 seconds total), and 10 seconds (by automatic
page timer) for each of the two picture pages (which con-
tained seven pictures each) in the multiple-quick condition
(20 seconds total, average of 1.43 seconds per picture). Thus,
it would appear that participants quickly “clicked through”
the identical images in the repeated condition but inspected
pictures more carefully in the careful condition (all p ! .01).
Product Agnosia. We found evidence of the product-
agnosia effect occurring only in the multiple-careful con-
dition but not in the multiple-repeated or quick conditions.
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FIGURE 2B
SIMILARITY PERCEPTIONS UNDER DIFFERENT VISUAL
CONDITIONS (EXPERIMENT 1)
FIGURE 2A
CHOICE DEFERRAL UNDER DIFFERENT VISUAL CONDITIONS
(EXPERIMENT 1)
Compared against the single-picture condition, participants
in the multiple-careful condition had more choice deferral
(Msingle p 26%, Mcareful p 49%; x2(120) p 6.72, p p .01;
fig. 2A) and higher perceptions of similarity of the products
(Msingle p 3.12, Mcareful p 3.58; t(117) p 2.12, p ! .05; fig.
2B). Although not significant, there was a pattern of greater
choice uncertainty (Msingle p 2.28, Mcareful p 2.75; t(117) p
1.89, p p .06) and less liking (Msingle p 5.15, Mcareful p
4.62; t(117) p 1.73, p p .08). As expected, there was no
difference in choice share between the two sunglasses (p p
.64)—in other words, product agnosia did not drive choice
share from one option to another (e.g., from a weaker brand
to a stronger brand). Rather, product agnosia seemed to make
both options less distinctive and less attractive.
There were no significant differences in choice deferral
(Msingle p 26%, Mrepeat p 35%, Mquick p 31%), choice un-
certainty (Msingle p 2.28, Mrepeat p 2.38, Mquick p 2.12),
liking (Msingle p 5.15, Mrepeat p 4.85, Mquick p 5.26), and
similarity perception (Msingle p 3.12, Mrepeat p 3.29, Mquick
p 3.23) between the single and repeated and multiple-quick
conditions (all p 1 .2).
Discussion
Experiment 1 provides an initial demonstration of the
product-agnosia effect. Although intuition would have sug-
gested that showing more pictures of products should high-
light their differences and abet differentiation, we found the
opposite effect. Participants who viewed more visual im-
pressions for each product (as operationalized by looking
through more pictures, one at a time) perceived the com-
parison products as more similar and less attractive than did
participants who received fewer visual impressions and saw
each product only once. The results on choice deferral and
uncertainty were consistent with a notion that product ag-
nosia made the two products seem more similar and harder
to distinguish. That product agnosia and greater choice un-
certainty was complemented by trending lower attractive-
ness ratings is consistent with prior research showing that
harder choices can result in less consumer satisfaction and
commitment toward products (Mogilner, Shiv, and Iyengar
2013). Indeed our measures showed significant internal and
conceptual consistency; liking was negatively correlated
with similarity ratings (r p .25, p ! .01), deferral (r p
.66, p ! .01), and choice uncertainty (r p .47, p ! .01),
while similarity ratings were correspondingly positively cor-
related with deferral (r p .22, p ! .01) and choice uncer-
tainty (r p .20, p ! .01).
Experiment 1 also provided process insight by identifying
two necessary conditions, (1) new visual information and
(2) sufficient time for processing. First, product agnosia did
not arise simply from seeing more pictures (in the multiple-
repeated condition). We only observed the effect from in-
creased inspection of new visual information. This suggests
that product agnosia is not simply driven by an increase in
object familiarity, which underlies mere exposure, satiation,
or visual habituation related mechanisms. However, this re-
sult is consistent with prior research showing that the rep-
etition of different visual configurations can disrupt visual
recognition by changing the relative basis of visual analyses
(Lockhead et al. 1978). Second, merely having new visual
information did not induce product agnosia when there was
limited time for visual inspection (10 seconds) in the mul-
tiple-quick condition. This suggests that beyond being ex-
posed to additional visual information, participants in the
multiple-careful condition also inspected the images with
greater scrutiny than would have been possible in the mul-
tiple-quick condition. This boundary condition is consistent
with visual perception research suggesting that at-a-glance
inspection yields only the “gist,” while detail-oriented pro-
cessing only comes about with sufficient time and scrutiny
(Smith 2001).
Experiment 1 also provides evidence against a cognitive
overload account—that seeing more pictures induced over-
load that reduced participants’ ability to discern products.
We found no between-condition differences in participants’
cognitive resource scores at the end of the experiment. Fur-
thermore, an overload account would also have predicted
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that viewing 12 more pictures in the multiple-repeated and
quick conditions should have been sufficient to induce prod-
uct agnosia, which was not the case. Overall, the results of
experiment 1 were in line with our hypothesized product-
agnosia account: that increased attention given to different
details of new visual information changes perceptual focus,
which then affects comparative evaluations. This account is
investigated in the next experiment, where a thought-listing
task qualifies changes in attention and focus when decision
makers are shown more visual impressions.
EXPERIMENT 2: THOUGHT LISTING
Experiment 2 extended the product-agnosia effect to an-
other product category (duffel bags: Dakine vs. Victorinox),
expanded our set of dependent measures, and explored the
product-agnosia mechanism with a thought-listing task. In
particular, the thought-listing task investigated whether see-
ing more pictures could have altered how individuals were
processing more visual impressions. This allowed us to test
our hypothesis that seeing more pictures could have led to
a shift in perceptual focus from the gestalt to the component
level, which then reduced products’ distinctiveness and at-
tractiveness.
Method
One hundred and two participants recruited from an online
participant database maintained by the Stanford University
Graduate School of Business Behavioral Lab were randomly
assigned to the single-picture (one picture of each bag) or
the multiple-picture condition (seven unique pictures of each
bag, each on a different page). The visual stimuli were pre-
sented using the same basic experimental paradigm as ex-
periment 1 (single and multiple-careful conditions).
In contrast to experiment 1, and in order to triangulate
measures of product agnosia, we measured perceptions of
distinctiveness with a relative uniqueness measure. Partic-
ipants rated how unique each bag looked relative to another
(1 [not unique at all] to 7 [very unique]), indicated choice
of bag (for incentive compatibility, participants had the
chance to win their chosen bag in a lottery), predicted liking
for the chosen bag (1 [not like at all] to 7 [like very much]),
rated interest in learning more about the bags (1 [not in-
terested at all] to 7 [very interested]), and reported interest
in shopping for the two bags (1 [not interested at all] to 7
[very interested]). The order of questions was reversed rel-
ative to experiment 1, in order to rule out question-order
effects. Relative uniqueness scores for each bag were av-
eraged to create a composite score for perceived uniqueness
(r p .45, p ! .01). Since attitudinal strength of interest is
conceptually related to strength of preference, the two in-
terest measures and the predicted liking measure were av-
eraged to create a strength of preferences index (a p .73).
At the end of the survey, participants were asked to list
their thoughts about the products. Two independent coders
coded responses for total number of thoughts listed and
number of component-level thoughts. In line with prior re-
search on perceptual focus (Kimchi 1992), coders catego-
rized descriptions of functions and features as “component
oriented” and overarching descriptions of style and dimen-
sions as “gestalt oriented.” For example, “professional look-
ing,” “light,” and “sporty” were coded as gestalt oriented,
while “extra side pockets,” “prominent logo,” and “tough-
looking fabric” were coded as component oriented. Due to
the high interrater reliability achieved (r p .97 for total
thoughts, and r p .99 for perceptual focus), these scores
were averaged to form an index score for total thoughts and
an index score for perceptual focus.
Results and Discussion
Consistent with experiment 1, we found that perceptions
of product uniqueness, which is conceptually related to prod-
uct distinctiveness and opposite to product similarity, were
lower in the multiple-picture than in the single-picture con-
dition (Msingle p 3.67, Mmult p 3.16; t(97) p 2.07, p ! .05).
Similarly, strength of preference for the products was lower
in the multiple-picture condition than in the single-picture
condition (Msingle p 4.31, Mmult p 4.95; t(97) p 2.34, p !
.05). Across conditions, strength of preferences was signif-
icantly correlated with uniqueness ratings (r p .54, p ! .01).
As expected, there were once again no significant differences
between conditions in choice of bag (p 1 .1), which implies
that the bags were not differentially affected by viewing
more visual impressions. Most germane to our interests, the
thought-listing task showed a higher number and proportion
of component-level thoughts (all p ! .05) in the multiple-
picture condition (M p 2.09, Pr(component) p 0.55) than
in the single-picture condition (M p 1.46, Pr(component)
p 0.39) but showed no difference in the total number of
thoughts between the two conditions (Msingle p 3.09, Mmult
p 3.36, p p .39).
Experiment 2 complements experiment 1 in showing that
inspecting more pictures of comparison objects primarily
differentiated by gestalt factors can render them less unique,
less preferred, and less interesting. These measures are all
strong predictors of consumer interest and purchase inten-
tions and suggest that the product-agnosia effect can be
detrimental for product positioning and brand image (Aaker
1997). The thought-listing task also yielded evidence that
inspecting more visual impressions can lead to a shift from
gestalt- to component-level visual processing. In experiment
3, we explicitly test this account by directly manipulating
style of perceptual focus.
EXPERIMENT 3: MANIPULATING THE
STYLE OF VISUAL PROCESSING
The thought-listing results of experiment 2 suggest that
the product-agnosia effect is driven at least in part by a shift
in style or level of perceptual focus. In experiment 3, we
assessed the mechanism by directly manipulating perceptual
focus and exogenously inducing gestalt- versus component-
oriented visual processing. If the negative effect of product
agnosia is caused by a switch in perceptual focus (from the
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FIGURE 3A
PERCEPTIONS OF COMPARISON OBJECTS’ UNIQUENESS
UNDER INDUCED GESTALT- VERSUS COMPONENT-LEVEL
PERCEPTUAL FOCUS (EXPERIMENT 3)
gestalt to the component level), then inducing gestalt-ori-
ented processing should attenuate the effect. Correspond-
ingly, if consumers are trapped in a component-level per-
ceptual focus during product agnosia, then exogenously
inducing component-oriented processing should only main-
tain product agnosia.
Method
One hundred and thirty-eight participants from the same
national online pool as experiment 2 were informed that
they were participating in two purportedly unrelated studies.
Part 1 was presented as an “image-processing study,” and
part 2 was presented as a separate “product evaluation
study.”
Manipulating Visual-Processing Style. In part 1, we in-
duced gestalt- versus component-level visual-processing
style using a procedure adopted from Friedman et al. (2003).
Participants were randomly assigned to the gestalt- or com-
ponent-level processing condition, in both of which they
were sequentially shown seven maps of different American
states (Arkansas, Iowa, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin), each on a different
page. In the gestalt-processing condition, participants were
asked to look at the overall features of each state map. In
the component-level processing condition, participants were
asked to focus their attention on a marker that pointed to a
city near the center of the map (Little Rock, Waterloo,
Worcester, Selinsgrove, Columbia, McMinnville, and Wau-
sau). For comparison purposes, we also included a control
condition that skipped the processing-style manipulation of
part 1 and was contained only in part 2.
Manipulation Check for Perceptual Focus. After view-
ing the maps, participants completed a Navon perceptual-
focus manipulation check (Navon 1977). First, participants
were asked to prepare to report their initial reactions to the
image on the next page. On the next page, participants were
presented with a large letter E that was formed by smaller
letter A’s. Participants were then asked whether they first
saw “a big E” or “a lot of small A’s,” whether the letter E
or A was more obvious on first glance, and how easy it was
to discern the letter E (1 p not easy at all, 7 p very easy).
Participants in a gestalt-processing mind-set should find it
easier to react to the large E than the smaller A’s (Navon
1977).
Visual Manipulation. In part 2, we used the same basic
experimental procedure as in experiment 1. Participants
were asked to imagine that they were shopping for boat
shoes (Polo vs. Sperry) and were randomly assigned to a
single- or multiple-picture condition. In the single-picture
condition, they were shown a single picture of each boat
shoe, and in the multiple-picture condition, they were shown
seven different pictures of each boat shoe, each on a new
page.
Participants were then asked to rate how unique each shoe
was (1 [not at all unique] to 7 [very unique]), which shoe
they would have picked (this choice was incentivized: par-
ticipants had the chance to win their chosen shoes in a
lottery), and how much they think they would like the shoe
they picked (1 [not at all] to 7 [very much]). The two unique-
ness scales (one for each shoe) were combined into one
uniqueness index (r p .79).
Results
Manipulation Check. Manipulation check results showed
that we successfully induced differences in visual-process-
ing style and perceptual scope. More participants reported
seeing the big E rather than the small A’s first (F(1, 101)
p 12.8, p ! .01), that the letter E was more obvious than
A on first glance (F(1, 100) p 13.1, p ! .01), and that E
was easier to spot (F(1, 101) p 7.97, p ! .01) in the gestalt-
oriented condition than in the component-oriented condition.
Next, we tested our hypothesized perceptual focus ac-
count: that induced gestalt perceptual focus should coun-
teract product agnosia, while increased component percep-
tual focus should maintain product agnosia. Thus, there
should be differences between the gestalt and control con-
ditions but not between the component and control condi-
tions. We submitted ratings of uniqueness, predicted liking,
and choice to a 3 (control, gestalt-level processing, com-
ponent-level processing) # 2 (single/multiple pictures)
ANOVA. Consistent with our predictions, we found statis-
tically significant interactions between our perceptual focus
manipulation and visual condition for uniqueness (F(2, 130)
p 4.89, p ! .01; fig. 3A) and liking ratings (F(2, 130) p
5.14, p ! .01; fig. 3B). In particular, as described in the post
hoc tests below, we found evidence of product agnosia re-
versing in the gestalt-processing condition but persisting in
the component-processing condition as compared against the
control condition. We also replicated the basic product-ag-
nosia main effect, as evidenced by lower ratings of unique-
ness (2.43 vs. 3.75) and liking (4.00 vs. 5.25) when partic-
ipants viewed more pictures in the control condition (all p
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! .05). Consistent with previous experiments, we found no
interaction or main effects for choice (F(2, 130) ! 1, p p
.58).
Gestalt versus Control. Post hoc tests revealed that see-
ing multiple versus single pictures had a reverse effect in
the gestalt as compared to the control condition. When par-
ticipants were shown multiple pictures, gestalt processing
resulted in higher ratings of uniqueness (Mcontrol p 2.43,
Mgestalt p 4.02, p ! .01) and liking (Mcontrol p 3.87, Mgestalt
p 5.33, p ! .01) as compared against the control condition.
There were no differences in uniqueness (Mcontrol p 3.75,
Mgestalt p 3.24, p p .20) and liking (Mcontrol p 5.25, Mgestalt
p 4.48, p p .70) ratings between gestalt and control con-
ditions in the single-picture condition, where there was no
scope for product agnosia to occur in the first place. One
might note that within the gestalt-processing condition, the
uniqueness and liking ratings are trending higher in the mul-
tiple-picture condition than the single-picture condition (all
p p .09)—an “enhancement” effect that we did not predict.
One possible reason for this unexpected trending difference
is that participants had more occasions to inspect gestalt-
level features in the multiple-picture condition. Greater elab-
oration on the defining and distinguishing gestalt-level fea-
tures of the product may then have then resulted in higher
product ratings.
Component versus Control. Post hoc tests revealed that
there were no significant differences in uniqueness and lik-
ing ratings between the control and component-processing
conditions in either the multiple-picture (uniqueness: Mcontrol
p 2.43, Mcomp p 2.79, p p .695; liking: Mcontrol p 4.00,
Mcomp p 4.03, p p .95) or single-picture conditions (unique-
ness: Mcontrol p 3.75, Mcomp p 3.54, p p .69; liking: Mcontrol
p 5.25, Mcomp p 4.96, p p .62). In other words, consistent
with our predictions, we find that the basic product-agnosia
effect persists under component-level processing, where vi-
sual condition (number of pictures) again has a main effect
on perceptions of uniqueness. However, our initial concep-
tualization did not predict a trending within-condition main
effect of number of pictures for component processing
(uniqueness: p p .07; liking: p p .04). It is possible that
induced local processing does not hinder uniqueness per-
ceptions when viewing one picture, but when viewing mul-
tiple pictures, participants had more occasions to engage in
detrimental component-oriented processing, which lowered
product ratings even more.
Gestalt versus Component. Finally, as a corollary of the
above findings and consistent with our hypotheses, post hoc
tests showed higher ratings of uniqueness and liking in the
multiple-picture condition under gestalt- as compared to
component-level processing (all p ! .01). As with previous
contrasts, there was no difference in the single-picture con-
dition (all p 1 .3). Overall, the gestalt versus component
comparisons were analogous to the gestalt versus control
comparisons.
Discussion
The persistence of the product-agnosia effect after in-
duced component processing and its reversal after induced
gestalt processing suggests that the product-agnosia effect
is driven by changes in perceptual-processing style. Indeed,
the parallel results between the component-processing con-
dition and the control condition suggest that the style of
processing is the same in both (i.e., both have component-
level perceptual focus). Together, the results of experiments
1–3 suggest that viewing more pictures of comparison ob-
jects led to relatively more component- and less gestalt-level
focus. When participants’ visual-processing style was com-
ponent level and focused on details, viewing more visual
impressions reduced perceptions of distinctiveness and pre-
dicted liking. However, when one takes a metaphorical step
back under gestalt-level processing, viewing more visual
impressions begins to yield benefits for a product’s per-
ceived distinctiveness and predicted liking. Experiment 3
highlights that viewing more pictures of comparison objects
does not unequivocally result in product agnosia, which rec-
onciles our findings with lay intuition and previous literature
on the benefits of more visual information. Rather, it is how
we process given visual information that determines whether
seeing more visual impressions is beneficial for product
evaluations.
EXPERIMENT 4: STIMULUS- VERSUS
MEMORY-BASED JUDGMENTS
In experiment 4, we further explored the perceptual focus
mechanism with an indirect manipulation and an additional
theory test: by contrasting memory- versus stimulus-based
judgments. Specifically, we examined the occurrence of
product agnosia when product judgments were made in im-
mediate response to the visual stimuli or through recall from
memory. In our previous experiments, we displayed the de-
fault picture of products above the dependent measures, so
judgments were based on immediately present stimuli ( just
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FIGURE 4A
PERCEPTIONS OF COMPARISON OBJECTS’ UNIQUENESS
UNDER STIMULUS- VERSUS RECALL-BASED EVALUATION
(EXPERIMENT 4)
as in a store or catalog, participants could look at the objects
while evaluating them). Previous research suggests that for
stimuli judgments, the focus can be at the gestalt or the
component level or both (Grill-Spector and Kanwisher
2005). However, information of stimuli recalled from mem-
ory tends to be predominantly gestalt oriented (Bartlett
1932) because memory and recollections are generally more
in the form of a gist rather than details (Hochstein and
Ahissar 2002; Nedungadi 1990). Consequently, the manip-
ulation of stimulus- versus memory-based judgments serves
as an additional theory test for perceptual focus: if product
agnosia is driven by shifts in perceptual focus level, then
the effect should attenuate when judgments are based on
recall.
Method
Visual Conditions. We repeated the same basic experi-
mental procedure as the previous three studies with the same
product category as experiment 1 (sunglasses: DKNY vs.
Michael Kors). One hundred and sixteen participants re-
cruited from a national online pool were first randomly as-
signed to the single-picture (one picture of each pair of
sunglasses) or multiple-picture condition (seven unique pic-
tures of each pair of sunglasses).
Manipulating Recall. After viewing the products, par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to either the stimulus or
the recall condition. In the stimulus condition, a picture of
each pair of sunglasses was displayed above the dependent
measures. This allowed participants to make evaluations of
the sunglasses while still looking at them (as in the previous
three experiments). In the recall condition, participants were
first given a 2-minute reading comprehension filler task be-
fore proceeding to the dependent measures page. On this
page, there were no pictures of the sunglasses. Participants
were given the same initial instructions as previous exper-
iments and were not warned that they may be asked to rely
on memory for evaluations.
Dependent Variables. Participants then rated how unique
each pair of sunglasses was (1 [not unique at all] to 7 [very
unique]), how similar the sunglasses were (1 [not similar at
all] to 7 [very similar]), how comparable the sunglasses were
(1 [not comparable at all] to 7 [very comparable]), how easy
it was to distinguish between the sunglasses (1 [not easy at
all] to 7 [very easy]), and how much they were willing to
pay for each pair of sunglasses (on a sliding scale [$0–
$100]). The uniqueness scores were averaged to create a
composite score of overall perceived uniqueness (r p .54,
p ! .01), and the three similarity measures were averaged
to create a composite score of similarity (a p .71; the last
measure was reverse coded).
Results
If memory-based judgments are more gestalt oriented in
perceptual scope than stimulus-based judgments, we would
expect a similar pattern of interactions as in experiment 3.
In particular, memory-based processing, like gestalt pro-
cessing, should counteract the overly component-oriented
perceptual focus induced by more visual impressions. How-
ever, no such reversal should occur for stimulus-based judg-
ments. We obtained results consistent with these expectations
after submitting measurements of uniqueness, similarity, and
willingness to pay to a 2 (stimulus or recall) # 2 (single
or multiple images) ANOVA. We found significant inter-
actions for perceptions of uniqueness (F(1, 105) p 8.63, p
! .01; fig. 4A), similarity (F(1, 107) p 8.33, p ! .01; fig.
4B), and willingness to pay (F(1, 87) p 3.84, p p .05; fig.
4C). In other words, we found that retrospective evaluations
reversed the product-agnosia effect.
Simple Main Effects. Within-condition differences of es-
timated marginal means in the stimulus condition were con-
sistent with the results of experiments 1–3. Seeing more
pictures had a marginally significant negative effect on prod-
uct evaluations, with lower ratings of uniqueness (Msingle p
4.05, Mmult p 3.36; F(1, 101) p 3.44, p p .07) and higher
perceptions of similarity (Msingle p 4.03, Mmult p 4.45; F(1,
103) p 3.25, p p .07). Although this result was not sta-
tistically significant, the pattern was consistent with the sta-
tistically significant results of previous studies. When par-
ticipants engaged in recall processing, the product-agnosia
effect was reversed, and viewing more pictures improved
product evaluations with relatively higher ratings of unique-
ness (Msingle p 3.37, Mmult p 4.25; F(1, 101) p 5.26, p !
.05) and decreased perceptions of similarity (Msingle p 4.66,
Mmult p 4.09; F(1, 103) p 5.17, p ! .05). Similarly, for
stimulus judgments, willingness to pay was marginally
lower in the multiple-picture condition (Msingle p $40.78,
Mmult p $30.00; F(1, 87) p 2.79, p ! .1), while under recalljudgments, willingness to pay was not negatively influenced
and in fact trended in the opposite direction (Msingle p
$30.33, Mmult p $38.16; F(1, 87) p 1.27, p p .26). Again,
while we cannot conclusively state that viewing more pic-
tures increased willingness to pay under recall processing,
this result at the very least suggests that retrospective eval-
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jcr/article-abstract/41/2/342/2907558
by University of Hong Kong Libraries user
on 28 February 2018
352 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
FIGURE 4B
PERCEPTIONS OF COMPARISON OBJECTS’ SIMILARITY
UNDER STIMULUS- VERSUS RECALL-BASED EVALUATIONS
(EXPERIMENT 4)
FIGURE 4C
WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR COMPARISON OBJECTS UNDER
STIMULUS- VERSUS RECALL-BASED EVALUATIONS
(EXPERIMENT 4)
uations can negate product agnosia’s negative effect on
product valuation.
Discussion
The implications of experiment 4 are twofold. First, it
provides an additional theory test that product agnosia is
driven by a shift in perceptual focus since memory cues are
generally more gestalt than component oriented (Bartlett
1932). Second, this experiment has direct managerial im-
plications since it reverses the damage of product agnosia
with an ecologically relevant moderator. In many decision-
making contexts, the consumer has the option to postpone
decisions. Indeed, our experimental conditions were de-
signed to be analogous to the following Internet shopping
scenarios: (1) examining visual information on a retail web-
site until a purchase decision is made (stimulus-based judg-
ments) or (2) leaving a retail website after saving your product
choice in a “shopping basket” and considering the purchase
later (memory-based judgments). The results of experiment
4 show that while more visual impressions can hurt eval-
uations in the former situation, they may actually help in
the latter. In experiments 5 and 6, we explore additional
boundaries of the product-agnosia effect. In particular, we
test products that are differentiated at the component rather
than the gestalt level, for which our process findings suggest
that product agnosia should not manifest.
EXPERIMENT 5: PRODUCTS
DISTINGUISHED BY COMPONENT AND
NOT GESTALT
An implicit necessary condition for the product-agnosia
effect is for comparison products to be distinct on the gestalt
but similar on the component level. Our previous experi-
ments showed that product agnosia occurred because in-
specting additional visual impressions resulted in a shift of
perceptual focus from the gestalt-level distinctions that dif-
ferentiated products to the component-level details that ho-
mogenized products. The products in our previous experi-
ments, like many in the real world, were relatively more
distinguished by gestalt-level visual features such as overall
style and design (Aaker 1997; Bloch et al. 2003; Corfman
1991; Hekkert and Leder 2008). However, this is not always
the case; products fall on a continuum in the comparative
importance of gestalt versus component (Bloch 1995), and
some are distinguished more by component-level features
(Townsend and Sood 2011). For example, technical products
like touch screen mobile phones have relatively similar over-
all designs (flat rectangular screen) and are distinguished
more by specific visible features (e.g., button location, cam-
era placement, operating system). Experiment 5 tests whether
the product-agnosia effect is attenuated when products in a
comparison set are similar on the gestalt level but distinctive
on the component level. For such products, the detriment
of decreased focus on gestalt-level features from more visual
impressions might be offset by the benefit of greater focus
on the relatively more important component-level features.
Method
Using the same experimental procedure as previous stud-
ies, we randomly assigned 135 participants from Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk online subject pool to view one or multiple
unique pictures of a component-oriented product: touch
screen smart phones (HTC EVO vs. LG Marquee phones).
In an independent pretest (N p 134) we confirmed that
touch screen mobile phones were considered to be relatively
more component oriented (p ! .01), whereas products in
previous experiments were considered to be relatively more
gestalt oriented (all p ! .01).
Dependent Variables. Participants rated how much they
liked each phone (1 [not at all] to 7 [very much]), how
unique the phones were (1 [not unique at all] to 7 [very
unique]), how similar (1 [not similar at all] to 7 [very sim-
ilar]) and how distinctive (1 [not distinctive at all] to 7 [very
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distinctive]) each phone was from the others, and how much
they were willing to pay for each phone, before being asked
to imagine choosing between the phones in a shopping con-
text. Participants were also given the opportunity to defer
their choice (“choose neither—go to the next store to see
more models”). Participants then rated their predicted liking
of their chosen phone (1 [not at all] to 7 [very much]) and
how regretful (1 [not regretful at all] to 7 [very regretful])
and how confident (1 [not confident at all] to 7 [very con-
fident]) they were in their choice. The scale measures were
also averaged into an index for liking (a p .62), an index
for similarity (a p .61), and an index for choice uncertainty
(a p .78).
Results
In line with the perceptual focus account, we did not find
evidence of product agnosia occurring for the component-
oriented mobile phones. There were no significant differ-
ences in liking (Msingle p 5.35, Mmult p 5.59; t(132) p 1.62,
p p .11) and similarity ratings (Msingle p 4.06, Mmult p
4.10, p p .86) between the multiple- and single-picture
conditions. In fact, product ratings trended to be more pos-
itive in the multiple-picture condition: willingness to pay
was marginally greater (Msingle p $96, Mmult p $108; t(132)
p 1.77, p p .08) and uniqueness perceptions were higher
(Msingle p 3.72, Mmult p 4.20; t(131) p 2.30, p ! .05) in
the multiple-picture condition. Furthermore, there was a
marginally significant decrease in choice deferral (x2(1, 135)
p 3.39, p p .07) and greater choice confidence (Msingle p
2.24, Mmult p 2.81; t(132) p 2.63, p ! .01) in the multiple-
picture condition.
Discussion
An attenuation (and partial reversal) of the product-ag-
nosia effect for component-oriented products establishes an
important boundary condition in support of a perceptual
focus account. In particular, the relative benefit or harm of
looking at more pictures when comparing products depends
on the perceptual focus orientation of the products being
examined. This result also reconciles our results with pre-
vious research showing the benefits of familiarity, mere ex-
posure, and increased information processing on product
evaluations (Bloch et al. 2003; Carpenter et al. 1994; Zajonc
1968). One might note that the differences in product mea-
sures were not all statistically significant. This might have
occurred because gestalt perceptions still mattered to a de-
gree for the comparison products, and thus the shift in per-
ceptual focus had an ambivalent effect.
That the product-agnosia effect occurs for gestalt-oriented
products but does not occur for component-oriented prod-
ucts is not easily explained by alternative accounts unrelated
to perceptual focus. For example, one could have wondered
whether the symmetrical visual orientations of the pictures
of product pairs (e.g., for every picture of product A, there
was always a corresponding picture of product B from the
same angle) were inducing the increased similarity percep-
tions that characterized product agnosia. However, the re-
versal of the effect with the same experimental paradigm
shows that the visual procedure alone does not determine
whether product agnosia occurs. Rather, product agnosia
requires (1) a shift in perceptual focus (experiment 3) and
(2) for that shift in perceptual focus to be mismatched in
its relation to the perceptual focus level that differentiates
products.
EXPERIMENT 6: MANIPULATING
COMPONENT- VERSUS GESTALT-LEVEL
DIFFERENCES
Experiment 5 showed that product agnosia reverses for a
product that is primarily distinguished by component-level
differences. Experiment 6 further explored this key bound-
ary condition by exogenously manipulating whether a com-
parison set for one product category (dresses) is differen-
tiated on gestalt or component levels. In particular, we
manipulated whether one dress is compared against a dress
that is different on the gestalt level (style of dress) but similar
on the component level (cut of dress) or a dress that is similar
on the gestalt level but different on the component level.
On the basis of the results of previous experiments, we
would expect product agnosia to only occur when two
dresses are distinguished by gestalt features (style) but for
the opposite effect to occur when two dresses are distin-
guished by component features (cut). The within-product-
category design of experiment 6 also provides a stronger
test of the perceptual focus account. Since all previous ex-
periments included only one set of binary contrasts within
the same product category, it was still possible that product
agnosia was driven by some contextual particularities such
as product type. However, directly inducing and reversing
product agnosia for the same product category provides even
stronger evidence for a perceptual-focus mechanism.
Method
Manipulating Visual Inspection and Perceptual Focus
Orientation of Contrast. We repeated the same basic ex-
perimental procedure as previous studies with images of two
women’s dresses, which differed from each other on either
a gestalt (style) or a component level (cut). One hundred
and thirty participants (all female) recruited from Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk online subject pool were randomly as-
signed to view (1) single pictures or (2) seven unique pic-
tures of two dresses that were either (1) similar in gestalt
and different in component or (2) different in gestalt and
similar in component. The product comparisons comprised
a black-and-white-striped style dress with a long cut that
was paired with either (1) a black-and-white-striped style
dress with a short cut (similar gestalt, different component)
or (2) a fuchsia floral print style dress with a long cut (dif-
ferent gestalt, similar component). An independent manip-
ulation check confirmed that the dresses’ style of pattern
(e.g., black-and-white stripes or fuchsia floral print) was
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FIGURE 5B
SIMILARITY RATINGS FOR PRODUCTS THAT DIFFER ON THE
GESTALT OR COMPONENT LEVEL (EXPERIMENT 6)
FIGURE 5A
CHOICE DEFERRAL FOR PRODUCTS THAT DIFFER ON THE
GESTALT OR COMPONENT LEVEL (EXPERIMENT 6)
considered to be relatively more gestalt than component
oriented as compared to cut (t(269) p 8.44, p ! .01).
Dependent Variables. As with previous studies, we mea-
sured similarity perceptions, liking ratings, and choice un-
certainty. Participants first rated how much they liked each
dress (1 [not at all] to 7 [very much]), how much they liked
the pattern of each dress (1 [not at all] to 7 [very much]),
how similar the dresses were (1 [not similar at all] to 7 [very
similar]), and how distinctive the dresses were from each
other (1 [not distinct at all] to 7 [very distinct]). On the next
page, which had pictures of the dresses at the top, partici-
pants were asked to imagine that they were shopping at the
store and making a choice between the two dresses. Partic-
ipants were also given the chance to defer their choice
(“choose neither—go to the next store to see more dresses”).
Participants then rated how regretful (1 [not regretful at all]
to 7 [very regretful]) and confident they were in their choice
(1 [not confident at all] to 7 [very confident]). The scale
measures were averaged into an index for liking (a p .88),
an index for similarity (a p .77), and an index for choice
uncertainty (a p .78).
Results
A switch in perceptual focus is only detrimental when it
results in less focus on what differentiates products and
greater focus on what homogenizes products. Thus, product
agnosia should only arise when products are primarily dif-
ferentiated by gestalt features (style of pattern), while the
reverse effect should arise when products are primarily dif-
ferentiated by component features (cut). A 2 (single vs. mul-
tiple pictures) # 2 (similar style different cut vs. different
style similar cut) ANOVA yielded results in line with these
predictions for choice deferral (F(1, 122) p 5.63, p ! .05;
fig. 5A), similarity perceptions (F(1, 122) p 4.32, p ! .05;
fig. 5B), liking ratings (F(1, 122) p 5.02, p ! .05; fig. 5C),
and choice uncertainty (F(1, 122) p 4.60, p ! .05; fig. 5D),
There was no significant interaction on choice of dress (p
p .63); more pictures did not result in one dress gaining
choice share over the other.
Discussion
Experiment 6 replicates product agnosia in a new com-
parison paradigm, provides further evidence of a perceptual
focus mechanism, and highlights that the impact of product
agnosia depends on the perceptual focus level that products
are differentiated by. The results also reconcile the negative
impact of product agnosia in experiments 1–4 with the ef-
fect’s attenuation for component-oriented product categories
in experiment 5 within a single perceptual focus framework.
Rather than being a strictly detrimental effect, product ag-
nosia seems to have an ambivalent impact on consumers’
perceptions; more visual impressions only impair product
evaluations when comparison objects are differentiated on
the gestalt level but boost product evaluations when com-
parison objects are differentiated on the component level.
Thus, the product-agnosia phenomenon is a kind of (mis)-
matching effect in which more visual impressions are ben-
eficial if processing style and perceptual focus orientation
of products are consistent but detrimental if they are incon-
sistent.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Despite the intuition that showing more visual impres-
sions should help distinguish products, this research showed
that the opposite can occur. In a variety of product cate-
gories, showing additional visual impressions can ironically
undermine products’ distinctiveness, decrease attractiveness,
increase choice deferral and uncertainty, and lower monetary
valuations. This product-agnosia effect arises when viewing
more visual impressions of comparison objects leads to more
component-oriented processing and less gestalt-oriented
processing. Such a shift in perceptual focus is detrimental
for the comparative evaluation of products primarily distin-
guished by gestalt-level differences like style and design
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FIGURE 5C
LIKING RATINGS FOR PRODUCTS THAT DIFFER ON THE
GESTALT OR COMPONENT LEVEL (EXPERIMENT 6)
FIGURE 5D
CHOICE UNCERTAINTY FOR PRODUCTS THAT DIFFER ON
THE GESTALT OR COMPONENT LEVEL (EXPERIMENT 6)
(experiments 1 and 2). In line with this mechanism, the effect
is moderated by style of visual processing (experiment 3)
and stimulus- versus memory-based judgments (experiment
4). However, the effect reverses for products that are distin-
guished by component- rather than gestalt-level differences
(experiments 5 and 6). Thus, more pictures are detrimental
only when they cause a mismatch in how consumers process
visual information.
This research takes a first step in answering the question
posed at the start of the article: If a picture is worth a
thousand words, then are multiple pictures worth even more?
The answer is that it depends on how you look at the pic-
tures. Our finding that seeing only one picture of each prod-
uct yielded more positive evaluations does not make any
normative claims about the intrinsic value of information;
clearly, 14 different pictures objectively carry more infor-
mation than two pictures. Rather, we argue that seeing more
pictures can impair comparative evaluations because they
change how one looks at objects. Showing more pictures
only hurts comparative product evaluations if visual-pro-
cessing style is inconsistent with products’ perceptual focus
orientation. Thus, the impact of showing consumers more
visual impressions depends on successfully matching the
orientation or format of visual content and the visual-pro-
cessing style of consumers.
Directions for Future Research
Depth of Decision Making. Our demonstration of the
product-agnosia effect and its attendant processes is con-
sistent with a growing body of research highlighting the
benefits of relying on initial, simple, and quick impressions.
For example, research on “thin slices” suggests that overall
judgments are heavily based on first impressions, which can
be formed within seconds of initial exposure (Ambady, Ber-
nieri, and Richeson 2000). In a variety of contexts including
interpersonal attraction to teacher evaluations, thin slices
were found to be as accurate as more extensive and careful
observations. Recent research in decision making has also
shown that overthinking and overcomplicating choice can
lead to increased focus on relatively unimportant aspects,
which results in people becoming mired in a “decision
quicksand” (Schrift, Netzer, and Kivetz 2011; Sela and Ber-
ger 2012). Indeed, our phenomenon can be thought of as a
kind of “visual quicksand” and is largely driven by a too
narrow focus. This is underlined by the fact that the product-
agnosia effect reverses if people take a metaphorical step
back and employ gestalt processing (experiment 3) or use
visual memory cues in lieu of immediate visual stimuli (ex-
periment 4). The existence of cognitive and metacognitive
parallels in decision-making literature to our visually based
phenomenon suggests that there is scope for future research
to unify the kindred undercurrents of our research streams:
that quick impressions can help if gestalt-level processing
is important but that increased effort and focus (whether
cognitive or visual) can hurt if component-level aspects are
relatively unimportant.
Information Overload. On a superficial level, our ex-
perimental paradigm may appear similar to information
overload experimental paradigms, for example, choice over-
load, resource depletion, and feature fatigue effects (Iyengar
and Lepper 2000; Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd
2010; Thompson, Hamilton, and Rust 2005), since partic-
ipants were asked to visually process more information in
one condition. However, several of our experimental results
run against such mechanisms. An overload account would
have predicted that viewing repeated pictures of the same
product in experiment 1 was more cognitively taxing than
viewing just one picture, which was not the case. Manip-
ulation checks also showed no differences in participants’
cognitive resource scores at the end of experiment 1 between
any of the visual conditions. Finally, that attenuations and
reversals of the product-agnosia effect arose in experiments
3–6 also runs against an overload mechanism. It is likely
that no information overload effects arose simply because
our “see more pictures” manipulation was not particularly
cognitively taxing. Participants viewed at most 12 additional
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images of everyday products: a task that is relatively trivial
for the vast parallel-processing capabilities of the human
visual system. However, the notion of having created mal-
adaptive difficulties in visual or cognitive processing with-
out actually having undermined our cognitive resources, an
idea that is seen more frequently in visual-processing lit-
erature (Biederman 1989; Treisman 1998), is certainly a
motif that future investigators could expand on in the con-
sumer behavior domain.
Comparative versus Noncomparative Multiple Exposure
Paradigms. The product-agnosia experimental paradigm
uniquely combines comparative evaluations and multiple
visual exposures. This is in contrast to extant consumer
choice paradigms, which use only one or the other. For
example, repeat exposure effects like the mere-exposure ef-
fect (Zajonc 1968) examine the effect of multiple visual
exposures on a single object. In our experiments, two prod-
ucts are always shown the same number of times (one or
seven) within each condition, and thus the comparative judg-
ments actually benefit from the same amount of exposure,
familiarity, and fluency. Furthermore, the product-agnosia
effect only occurs when new visual information is present
(experiment 1) and will not occur if participants are reex-
posed to the same picture repeatedly (which is analogous
to the mere-exposure paradigm). The comparative nature of
the product-agnosia paradigm similarly separates itself from
satiation, visual habituation, cognitive overload, or mental
wear-out paradigms, none of which are comparative and
which several of our manipulation checks further rule out.
Single versus Multiple Images. In a similar vein, the
product-agnosia experimental design yields different results
from comparative paradigms that do not use multiple visual
exposures. For example, research by Fo¨rster and colleagues
(Fo¨rster 2009; Fo¨rster and Dannenberg 2010) found that
more global processing should generally increase percep-
tions of similarity between objects relative to local pro-
cessing. On first glance, this finding may seem contrary to
product agnosia, which shows that more gestalt (global) and
less component (local) perceptual focus can decrease per-
ceptions of similarity between objects. However, this dis-
crepancy likely arises because Fo¨rster (2009) employed iso-
lated single images or memory-based evaluations of visual
stimuli, while product agnosia depended on multiple visual
impressions under stimuli processing. Indeed, we obtained
results consistent with Fo¨rster (2009) within our single-pic-
ture and memory-based conditions. Future research may in-
vestigate additional crossroads between product agnosia and
similar but contrasting experimental paradigms in greater
depth.
Degree and Category of Difference. In this research, the
products used as visual stimuli were relatively similar and
comparable and belonged to the same product categories.
While intracategory product comparisons are common in
consumer judgment, cross-category comparisons or com-
parisons between drastically different products may be in-
teresting extensions of the product-agnosia paradigm. For
example, previous literature on assimilation and contrast
effects suggests that while assimilation is more likely to
occur when objects are very similar, contrast is more likely
to occur when objects are very different (Mussweiler 2001).
This would predict that viewing more pictures of product
pairings that are highly distinct should increase distinctive-
ness ratings. At the same time, a separate research stream
has demonstrated that less comparable objects, such as ob-
jects in different categories, may automatically be abstracted
to a more gestalt (and comparable) level and not compared
on a component level ( Johnson 1984), which makes assim-
ilation effects more likely (Fo¨rster et al. 2008), a set of
findings in line with our results. Likely, the persistence of
product agnosia in cross-category comparisons will depend
heavily on how categorization and grouping occurs, which
experiment 6 suggests can be highly contextualized and sus-
ceptible to framing effects.
Orientation of Stimuli. In an unreported study, we tested
whether the effect could be driven by similarities in how
the products were positioned in all visual conditions, which
then induced component-style processing. We reran the sin-
gle-picture and multiple-unique-picture conditions of ex-
periment 1 along with a condition in which the orientation
and perspective of products was different. In this condition,
we used the same pictures as the multiple-unique condition
but rotated alternating pictures of each product 180 degrees
so that the perspective of the first picture of the first product
was flipped relative to the first picture of the second product,
and so on. We measured similarity, distinctiveness, and
uniqueness, which were combined into a similarity index
(a p .76). We replicated the basic effect that products in
the multiple-unique condition were perceived to be more
similar than in the single-picture condition (Msingle p 2.88,
Mmult uniq p 3.50; t(106) p 2.68, p ! .05). Product agnosia
also persisted in the different perspectives condition (Msingle
p 2.88, Mmult uniq rot p 3.37; t(105) p 2.15, p ! .05). In
fact, there was no significant difference between the rotated
and nonrotated multiple-unique-picture conditions (p p
.59), which suggests that perspective and orientation was
not an independent effect.
Precise Visual Mechanism. Despite showing that prod-
uct agnosia is driven by a change in perceptual focus, the
precise visual mechanism behind this change remains an
open question. For example, we do not know what details
participants initially focused on, what their path of visual
inspection was, or when perceptual focus switches. Future
investigations may use eye-tracking or implicit measures of
visual attention and gaze to explore the precise changes in
visual scrutiny that may underlie the effect. Although we
exclusively used a single-multiple visual impression para-
digm to explore product agnosia, there is conceptually no
reason why product agnosia cannot also be induced with
single pictures; if participants were forced to examine one
picture for a sufficient duration, perhaps their gaze would
start shifting toward the details. Alternatively, seeing how
participants manipulate or scrutinize a 3-D digital object or
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physical products would also be an ecologically relevant
alternative operationalization of the effect.
Conclusion
This research shows that the intuition of “showing more
is better” is often not true and that the marketer’s instinct
to highlight differences by offering more visual impressions
can backfire. When product agnosia occurs, looking at more
can lead to seeing less if shifts in perceptual focus make
consumers lose track of what differentiated products in the
first place. Rather, the relative benefit of showing more vi-
sual impressions depends on whether the relative perceptual
focus orientation of the products meshes with consumers’
visual-processing style. Beyond taking the first step in dem-
onstrating the product-agnosia effect, we hope that the find-
ings will encourage greater exploration of the counterintui-
tive influences of visual information and visual processing
on consumer choice.
DATA COLLECTION INFORMATION
The first author analyzed the data from experiment 1,
which were collected from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk on-
line subject pool with support from the Stanford University
Graduate School of Business Behavioral Lab. The first and
second authors analyzed the data from experiment 2, which
were collected from a nationally representative online sub-
ject pool managed by the Stanford University Graduate
School of Business Behavioral Lab. The first author ana-
lyzed the data from experiment 3, which were collected from
the same online subject pool as experiment 2. The first and
second authors analyzed the data from experiment 4, which
were from the same online subject pool as experiment 2.
The first author analyzed the data from experiments 5 and
6, which were collected from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
with support from the Stanford University Graduate School
of Business Behavioral Lab.
APPENDIX
FIGURE A1
PRODUCTS USED IN EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 4
NOTE.—DKNY (left ) and Michael Kors (right ) sunglasses.
FIGURE A2
PRODUCTS USED IN EXPERIMENT 2
NOTE.—Dakine (left ) and Victorinox (right ) duffel bags.
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FIGURE A3
PRODUCTS USED IN EXPERIMENT 3
NOTE.—Ralph Lauren Polo (left ) and Sperry Topsider (right ) boat shoes.
FIGURE A4
PRODUCTS USED IN EXPERIMENT 5
NOTE.—HTC EVO (left ) and LG Marquee (right ) touch screen mobile phones.
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FIGURE A5
PRODUCTS USED IN EXPERIMENT 6
NOTE.—Component-level differences condition (top) contrasts two dresses that have similar styles of pattern (gestalt) but different cuts
(component); gestalt-level differences condition (bottom) contrasts two dresses that have different styles of pattern (gestalt) but similar cuts
(component).
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